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ABSTRACT 
 
Rankings of countries on mean levels of self-reported Conscientiousness continue to puzzle 
researchers. Based on the hypothesis that cross-cultural differences in the tendency to prefer 
extreme response categories of ordinal rating scales over moderate categories can influence the 
comparability of self-reports, this study investigated possible effects of response style on the mean 
levels of self-reported Conscientiousness in 22 samples from 20 countries. Extreme and neutral 
responding were estimated based on respondents’ ratings of 30 hypothetical people described in 
short vignettes. In the vignette ratings, clear cross-sample differences in extreme and neutral 
responding emerged. These responding style differences were correlated with mean self-reported 
Conscientiousness scores. Correcting self-reports for extreme and neutral responding changed 
sample rankings of Conscientiousness, as well as the predictive validities of these rankings for 
external criteria. The findings suggest that the puzzling country rankings of self-reported 
Conscientiousness may to some extent result from differences in response styles. 
 
Keywords: response style; extreme responding; Conscientiousness; cross-cultural; personality. 
 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
In addition to comparing individuals within cultures, people’s personality trait levels are often 
compared across cultures (e.g., Schmitt, Allik, McCrae, & Benet-Martinez, 2007; McCrae et al., 
2005). The latter type of comparisons, especially, may sometimes lead to surprising and puzzling 
results. A good example is Conscientiousness, a broad Five-Factor Model (McCrae & John, 1992) 
personality trait that encompasses more specific traits such as being orderly, virtuous, traditional, 
self-controlled, responsible and industrious (Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005). 
Rankings of countries (which are typically equated with cultures) on mean self-reported 
Conscientiousness scores (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2007) are often considered counter-intuitive (e.g., 
Heine, Buchtel, & Norenzayan, 2008). The reason for this is that richer countries with higher life-
expectancies have generally lower mean scores of self-reported Conscientiousness than poorer 
countries with lower life-expectancies; that is, the culture-level (often called ecological) correlations 
have been exactly opposite to the typical individual-level findings (Heine et al., 2008; but see also 
Mõttus, Allik, & Realo, 2010; Mõttus et al., 2011). Of course, the ecological correlations do not 
necessarily have to mirror individual-level associations—in fact, they may be even completely 
opposite (Robinson, 1950)—but there is yet no good explanation as to why high mean levels of 
Conscientiousness should be associated with poverty and low average life-expectancy, which 
suggests the possibility that country-level mean Conscientiousness scores may be biased in some 
ways (Mõttus et al., 2011).  
One potential source of bias is believed to be the reference group effect (RGE; Heine, 
Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Heine et al., 2008), according to which different cultures have 
different subjective standards for traits. When people from different cultural settings base their 
subjective trait-ratings on different standards, their ratings are incomparable and cross-cultural 
comparisons are therefore distorted. However, Mõttus and colleagues (2011) found only modest 
support for the RGE in Conscientiousness-ratings across 22 samples representing different 
  
geographical and cultural groups. As a result, other potential biases should also be considered. 
Another possible threat to cross-cultural comparisons of ratings based on ordinal rating-scales 
(e.g. Likert-type or bipolar scales) comes from response styles which have been defined as 
systematic and pervasive tendencies “to respond to questionnaire items on some basis other than the 
specific item content” (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17). One such response style is extreme responding: the 
preference of extreme responses over more moderate ones when answering questionnaire items 
(Paulhus, 1991). Extreme response style may increase the variance of scores because people who 
tend to prefer more extreme responses will obtain higher (or lower) scores than those who choose 
moderate response categories, even when their true trait levels are identical. As a result, response 
style differences alone could potentially contribute to cross-country differences in the variability of 
test scores—a phenomenon often observed in personality traits, for example (Schmitt et al., 2007). 
Perhaps even more important is that extreme response style can also confound the comparisons of 
mean scores, which is one of the most essential methods of cross-cultural research (e.g., McCrae et 
al., 2005). If mean scores of self-report items systematically differ from the scale midpoints 
upwards or downwards, extreme response style will either inflate or depress these mean scores, 
respectively (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001). This is because the chances that extreme 
responding inflates or deflates the scores are unequal if most people endorse the same side of the 
scale: in this case, extreme responding systematically produces either higher (if most people tend to 
endorse the higher end of the scale) or lower item scores (if the lower end of the scale is more often 
endorsed). Moreover, although extreme response style may often be associated with increased scale 
variance as said above, when item mean scores systematically differ from the scale midpoint 
extreme response style may, in fact, decrease rather than increase the variance of the scores.  
Having most or even all items of a multi-item trait measure systematically skewed in one 
direction—which would allow response style differences to create a systematic bias in mean trait 
scores—is not an unlikely scenario as people are generally known for the tendency to err on the 
  
socially desirable sides of rating scales (Krueger, 1998). Consistent with this, Mõttus and colleagues 
(2011) reported that in 20 out of their 22 samples mean scores of all self-reported 
Conscientiousness items were above the scale midpoint (i.e., towards higher levels of the trait), due 
to socially desirable responding or poor scale design, for example. Consequently, if there were 
differences across the samples in the preference for extreme responses to these Conscientiousness 
items, this may have distorted cross-sample comparisons of the self-reported trait scores.  
There already exists a body of evidence demonstrating cross-cultural differences in the 
tendency to prefer extreme response categories of the ordinal rating-scales over more moderate 
responses (Harzing, 2006). To give some examples, van Herk, Poortinga and Verhallen (2004) 
investigated differences in response styles across six European countries and found that Greeks 
were the most likely to give extreme responses. Chen, Lee, and Stevenson (1995) reported that 
American students were more likely to choose extreme response categories of ordinal rating-scales 
than Japanese and Chinese students, suggesting that Asian cultures may prefer a more moderate 
response style than Western cultures. Less is known about the response styles of African cultures 
though. 
There is a difficulty, however, related to quantifying response styles such as extreme 
responding on the basis of self-report (or peer-report) measures. The problem is that typically the 
phenomenon being rated (e.g., a personality trait or a value dimension) itself is expected to vary 
across the targets of the ratings or, at least, differences in how the phenomenon is perceived are 
likely to tap substantive variance (e.g., perception of national stereotypes). As a result, variance in 
the ratings simultaneously reflects at least two components: substantive variance due to veridical 
individual or cultural differences and variance due to biases such as extreme response style 
(Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008). Therefore, attempts to estimate extreme response style on 
the basis of self- or peer-reports (e.g., by calculating the ratio of extreme responses to more 
moderate responses) risk misinterpreting substantive variance as bias. For instance, in some 
  
countries people may indeed have higher levels of and/or vary more on personality traits compared 
to people in other countries (Schmitt et al., 2007), which, then, inclines them to gravitate towards 
the extreme response categories of test items.  
The risk of confounding substantive variance and response bias is lower if extreme 
responding is estimated on the basis of items that measure different constructs and are uncorrelated 
(i.e., uncorrelated items reflect no single substantive construct to be confounded with response 
style; Greenleaf, 1992; Hamamura et al., 2008). Indeed, using uncorrelated items is a viable 
approach that can often be used to quantify extreme response style end estimate its effect on cross-
cultural comparisons. A particular strength of this method is that it does not require administering 
additional items. But this approach also has some potential downsides. First, it assumes that several 
unrelated constructs are measured at the same time because otherwise there will be no uncorrelated 
items available. As such, this is not a big problem because most surveys are likely to measure 
several constructs. Often, however, finding a sufficient number of uncorrelated items may be 
difficult even when multiple constructs, such as Big Five personality traits, are measured because 
the traits tend to be intercorrelated (e.g. van der Linder, te Nijenhuis, & Bakker, 2010; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), for one reason or another. Second, and perhaps relatedly, response styles 
themselves can cause spurious intercorrelations between items (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001), 
which may also make identifying a sufficient number of uncorrelated items more difficult.  
It has also been suggested that response styles can be dealt with by ipsatizing scores (Fischer, 
2004). This procedure standardizes respondents’ (or groups’) scores on a set of constructs in relation 
to their grand mean, so that respondents’ (groups’) scores on every trait become relative to the other 
scores of the same respondent (group). This, too, is a viable method but has some potential caveats. 
For example, this procedure also requires a number of constructs being measured at the same time. 
More important, however, is that ipsatization may change the substantive meaning of the 
transformed scores. For example, the grand mean differences between people or groups, which are 
  
removed with this procedure, may also convey meaningful information (besides possibly reflecting 
biases). Additionally, this procedure does not allow a straightforward quantification of extreme 
response style, so its actual contribution to the scores remains difficult to estimate. For some 
researchers, having a direct and intuitively clear measure of response styles may be appealing, 
especially given that response styles may constitute interesting variables in their own right. 
Taken together, additional and complementary ways of quantifying extreme response style 
will potentially be helpful for identifying and overcoming its possible confounding role in cross-
cultural comparisons. 
 
The Present Study 
A method called ‘anchoring vignettes’ could offer another possible solution for the above-
described problem of possibly confounded true variance and response style effects. The method was 
originally developed in political sciences (King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004; King & Wand, 
2007) but was also employed by Mõttus and colleagues (2011) to investigate the role of the RGE in 
cross-cultural comparisons of Conscientiousness ratings. In the study by Mõttus and colleagues 
(2011), nearly 3,000 people from 20 countries (22 samples in total) rated their own 
Conscientiousness and that of 30 hypothetical people described in short vignettes. These 30 
hypothetical people portrayed six different facets of Conscientiousness from very low to very high 
levels of manifestation. The crucial feature of the study was that the vignettes were identical for all 
respondents. As a result, veridical individual differences among the rating-targets, inherently 
present in self-ratings, were eliminated as a source of variance. Besides this advantage, two other 
factors made the vignette ratings helpful in teasing out systematic biases such as extreme 
responding from other sources of variance. First, because the vignettes were designed to display 
very different levels of Conscientiousness, the chances that all sorts of response categories would be 
widely chosen were increased and, as a result, there was ample room for individual differences in 
  
response styles to emerge. Second, with a relatively large number of targets to be rated, it was less 
likely that among-rater variance in aggregate estimates of response style reflected random 
measurement error;  rather, it was likely that pervasive individual differences in rating biases such 
as extreme response style would ultimately “shine through”.   
Mõttus and colleagues (2011) found that sample-level mean vignette ratings were not 
consistently correlated with mean self-ratings, which offered little support for there being an RGE 
in cross-cultural comparisons of Conscientiousness. Reanalyzing the same unique data from a 
different perspective, the present study had three aims. First, it investigated whether there were 
differences across people from a wide range of geographical locations (22 samples in 20 countries) 
in the preference for extreme response categories of bipolar rating-scales over moderate ones when 
rating Conscientiousness of the 30 hypothetical people, regardless of item content. Second, it tested 
whether the sample rankings on extreme responding co-varied with the rankings of self-reported 
Conscientiousness scores, suggesting that the latter may have been confounded by differences in 
response style. Third, it examined whether correcting the sample rankings of self-reported 
Conscientiousness for response style differences had any effect on the rankings and their predictive 
validities for external criteria. Although linked to the same dataset, this study was different from the 
one by Mõttus and colleagues (2011), which focused exclusively on identifying the RGE—the 
original target of the anchoring vignettes method. The RGE is independent of extreme response 
style in both concept and measurement consequences. The RGE is based on the content of particular 
items, whereas extreme response style is defined as being independent of item content. Likewise, 
the possible effects of the RGE and extreme response style on cross-cultural comparisons of self-
reports are orthogonal: both can either inflate or deflate self-reported mean scores of particular 
samples in completely independent ways. 
 
  
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Altogether, 2,965 people from 20 countries participated in the study. The Peoples’ Republic of 
China was represented with three independent samples—from Beijing, Changchun, and Hong 
Kong. Due to its high degree of autonomy and differing recent history, Hong Kong was treated as a 
separate sample. Also, because the other two Chinese samples from different locations were tested 
with independently translated testing materials, they were treated separately in all analyses. The 22 
samples consisted exclusively of university students in order to keep the demographic profiles of 
the respondents similar. In the pooled sample, the mean age of participants was 22.17 years (SD = 
5.27 years) and 62.56% of the participants were women. The demographic characteristics of the 
local samples are given in Table 1 of Mõttus and colleagues (2011).  
 
Testing Materials  
Conscientiousness was measured using six bipolar items that tapped six specific facets of the 
trait: Competence, Order, Dutifulness, Achievement Striving, Self-Discipline, and Deliberation. The 
bipolar scales were taken from the National Character Survey (NCS; Terracciano et al., 2005). In 
the bipolar scales, the negative side of the trait was described on one and the positive side on the 
other end of the scale. Respondents were requested to mark one of the five different positions 
between the endpoints, with the middle one reflecting neutral or indecisive choice (i.e., not agreeing 
with either of the descriptions), the two response categories next to the middle category reflecting 
moderate preference for one of the end-points and the remaining two response categories reflecting 
extreme preference for one of the two end-points. For instance, for the Deliberation facet, 
participants had to mark one of the five positions between the end-points of the trait defined as 
“spontaneous, careless, thoughtless” and “cautious, reflective, careful”. For Competence, 
  
Dutifulness and Self-Discipline items, the descriptions reflecting high levels of the respective trait 
were on the left side, for the rest of the items they were on the right side: such item keying was 
retained throughout the analyses for the vignettes. However, self-reported Competence, Dutifulness 
and Self-Discipline items were reversed before averaging all six self-report item scores to get a 
composite Conscientiousness score. 
Five short descriptions of hypothetical people (vignettes) displaying various levels of the 
traits were drafted for each Conscientiousness facet (all vignettes are given in Appendix I of Mõttus 
et al., 2011). The five vignettes were intended to display different levels of the trait, from very low 
to very high. As for the NCS, the vignettes were first written in English and were then translated 
into the local languages where necessary, with the aim of retaining the meaning of the content as 
invariant as possible (except for the names of the people described in the vignettes: these were 
changed to better reflect local cultural circumstances). To ensure invariance in meaning, the 
translated testing materials were independently back-translated into English and the back-
translations were reviewed by the first three authors. Where necessary, subsequent modifications of 
the translations were requested.  
First, all participants rated their own Conscientiousness using the six bipolar scales. They then 
rated all 30 hypothetical people described in the vignettes using the same bipolar scales. Finally, 
respondents provided information about their ages and sex.  
Four people chose the neutral (middle-point “3”) response category for 26 to 30 vignettes out 
of the 30; assuming that this reflected careless responding, the ratings from these respondents were 
excluded from further analyses. There was no evidence of such excessive use of other response 
categories. 
 
External Criteria 
  
As did Mõttus and colleagues (2011) and other studies (Heine et al., 2008; Mõttus et al., 2010; 
Oishi & Roth, 2009), we used the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at Purchasing Power 
Parity in US Dollars and average life-expectancies (LE) as objective sample-level criterion 
variables for mean self-reported Conscientiousness. The GDP and LE values were obtained from 
the Human Development Index (2009). 
 
  
RESULTS 
 
Quantifying Response Styles 
First, we tested whether people were consistent in their preferences for extreme response 
categories over more moderate ones, regardless of whether they rated low or high levels of 
Conscientiousness; without this, there would be little reason to talk about a pervasive extreme 
response style. Because different response choices were not independent from each other (choosing 
one response category automatically precludes choosing any other category), testing for possible 
consistencies in response scale use would have been difficult on the basis of a single set of 
vignettes. We therefore divided the 30 vignettes into two independent subsets and estimated 
consistencies across these two subsets. One subset (A in Table 1) included the vignettes that 
displayed various levels of and were rated for Competence, Dutifulness and Self-Discipline (that is, 
the vignettes that were rated with the bipolar scales depicting higher trait-levels on the left side). 
The other subset (B in Table 1) included the remaining 15 vignettes that displayed various levels of 
and were rated for Order, Achievement-Striving and Deliberation (with high levels of the traits 
depicted on the right side of the bipolar scales). As mentioned above, such keying (for some scales 
high trait levels on the left and for others on the right) was retained throughout the analyses of the 
vignette ratings. 
Separately for both subsets, we then calculated how frequently each respondent had used any 
of the five response categories to rate the 15 vignettes. To account for occasional missing responses, 
we divided the individual frequencies by the total number of responses given by the respondent. 
The five response categories, from left to right, had the following average frequencies across all 
respondents: 0.34, 0.12, 0.11, 0.16, and 0.27, for the first set and 0.22, 0.22, 0.14, 0.11, and 0.31 for 
the second set of vignettes. Then, the correlations between the response category choice frequencies 
in these two independent subsets were calculated at the level of the whole sample (Table 1). 
  
Additionally, to test if this particular division of vignettes produced different correlations than any 
other division, we randomly split the vignettes into two equally sized subsets (i.e., 15 vignettes in 
both) and calculated the correlations between the respective response category frequencies observed 
in the two random subsets. We repeated this procedure 1,000 times and report the 2.5th   and 97.5th 
percentiles of the resulting correlations in Table 1. 
Table 1 about here 
There are four principal things to note in Table 1. First, those respondents who chose any of 
the five response categories more frequently than their peers in one subset also tended to prefer the 
same categories in the other subset (see the diagonal from top left to bottom right in Table 1). 
Similar patterns were generally observed when the vignettes were randomly split into subsets. 
These correlations also show that people who tended to give extreme negative (low 
Conscientiousness) ratings also tended to give extreme positive (high Conscientiousness) ratings, 
suggesting that the tendency to choose extreme responses was not restricted to either negative or 
positive trait levels. Second, despite the generally robust consistencies in preferring extreme or 
moderate response categories regardless of the pole of the dimension, there was some evidence for a 
slight tendency to prefer more strongly either negative or positive ratings (i.e., the valence also 
played a small role on top of the level of extremity). The correlations in the diagonal from top right 
to bottom left of the Table 1 [where the correlations address the frequencies of response categories 
that were exclusively matched in terms of valence (either high or low Conscientiousness) in 
addition to the level of extremity] were somewhat larger than those in the other diagonal [where the 
correlations compared the frequencies of response categories that exclusively contradicted in terms 
of valence (high vs low Conscientiousness)]. Additionally, compared to the correlations that were 
calculated exclusively between extreme response categories that reflected opposing trait-levels 
(correlations at top left and bottom right cells in the Table 1), the respective correlations from the 
randomly chosen subsets of vignettes were generally slightly higher.  
  
Third, by necessity, the observed consistencies in preferring response categories meant that 
people who more often used extreme responses in either of the two subsets less often used moderate 
response categories in the other subset. This pattern, too, was confirmed in the random splitting 
procedure. Fourth, the consistencies in the response category frequencies appeared to depend 
somewhat on the particular subsets of vignettes the frequencies were based on. That is, there was 
some variability in the correlations obtained from random subsets of vignettes and in a few cases 
these correlations did not overlap with those from the original subsets A and B. Despite this, the 
overall pattern was robust: no matter which subsets were used, individual differences in the 
tendencies to prefer either extreme or modest responses were always evident. Of note is that a 
similar pattern of associations was observed at the level of the mean frequencies of the 22 samples: 
higher average use of any of the five response categories in one subset of vignettes was associated 
with higher average use of the same response categories in the other subset. 
Put simply, the detailed evidence presented above indicates that people were relatively 
consistent in their preferences for extreme over moderate responses, largely regardless of the side of 
the scale involved. Therefore, the frequencies of extreme responses on both sides could be 
aggregated for the whole set of 30 vignettes and so could the frequencies of moderate responses.  
Next, we calculated the proportion of extreme to total responses, excluding neutral middle-
point response category choices, to form an index of extreme responding (ER) for each respondent. 
Designating the five response categories (from left to right) “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “5”, the ER was 
thus calculated as: ER = (“1” + “5”) / (“1” + “2” + “4” + “5”). The proportion of neutral middle-
point responses was not included in calculating the ER because, unlike the other response 
categories, it did not reflect any sort of agreement with the descriptions at scale end-points. Instead, 
it reflected neutrality or indecisiveness. Therefore, the frequency of neutral middle-point responses 
to the total number of responses was used as a separate, and complementary, index of neutral 
responding (NR). The two indices, ER and NR, were necessarily negatively correlated at r = -0.33 
  
(for the whole sample; p < 0.001). Because the study mainly focused on cross-sample differences, 
the means of the ER and NR for the 22 samples are given in Table 2. 
 
Response Profiles: The “Content” of the Response Style Indices 
Figure 1 illustrates the “content” of the sample mean ER and NR, displaying the sample mean 
frequencies for each of the five response categories chosen to rate the 30 vignettes. For visual 
clarity, mean frequencies are given only for three samples: the sample with the lowest ER (Hong 
Kong, China), a sample with a close-to-median ER (Estonia) and the sample with the highest ER 
(Changchun, China). The profile for Estonia was fairly similar to what would have been the average 
profile across all samples. With only five response categories, it is easy to see how the two indices 
effectively summarize the whole distribution of response frequencies. The ER quantifies the 
proportion of extreme agreement to total (both extreme and moderate) agreement: that is, ER 
simultaneously summarizes the “slopes” at both sides that are the steepest for Changchun (China) 
sample and almost flat for the Hong Kong (China) sample. Because the sum of the frequencies of 
the five response categories is fixed (i.e., the total number of responses), the NR basically 
summarizes the rest: the degree of neutrality of responding (or disagreement with either of the scale 
ends) and, at the same time, the “intercept” for the ER “slope”. Because the two statistics treated the 
middle-point response category differently, the NR rankings of the samples were different from 
their rankings of ER, with Estonians using neutral responses the least of the three sample and Hong 
Kong respondents using them the most among the three. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Cross-Sample Differences in Response Style 
Using general linear models, we next estimated the amounts of variance in the two indices 
attributable to differences among the samples. Because differences among the samples in mean ages 
  
and the proportions of women (Mõttus et al., 2011, Table 1) could have confounded the effects of 
sample on the ER and NR per se, age and sex were included as covariates in the models. A fair 
amount of the variance in the ER was accounted for by among-sample differences [8.2%, partial 
eta-squared (ηp2) = 0.082, p < 0.001]. Sex explained 2% of variance (ηp2 = 0.020, p < 0.001, women 
had higher ERs) whereas the age effect was not statistically significant. For the NR, 5.7% of 
variance was accounted for by among-sample differences (ηp2 = 0.057, p < 0.001) and far less by 
sex (ηp2 = 0.007, p < 0.001, men higher); the age effect was not significant. For comparison 
purposes, in self-rated Conscientiousness (mean of the six bipolar items for self), differences among 
samples, age and sex explained 15.3% (p < 0.001), 0.6% (p < 0.001), and 0.5% (p < 0.001) of total 
variance, respectively (older respondents and women had higher scores). In sum, there was a clear 
pattern of cross-sample differences in response styles as quantified on the basis of the vignette 
ratings. The lowest rates of extreme responding characterized Hong Kong (China), South-Korea, 
Germany, and Japan, while several African (e.g. Benin, South Africa, Senegal, Burkina Faso) and 
Southeast Asian (Malaysia, Philippines) samples, as well as Polish and Changchun (China) samples 
had the highest rates (Table 2). Most European nations, Australia and U.S. were characterized by 
medium rates of extreme responding.  
Table 2 about here 
 
Generalizability of the Response Styles from Vignettes to Self-Reports 
The response styles (ER and NR) in the vignette ratings generalized to some extent to those 
calculated on the six self-report items. In the latter, the response patterns were likely to characterize 
true individual differences in addition to response styles, and we might expect population variance 
in Conscientiousness to be smaller than that in the vignettes as these were designed to display very 
different levels of the trait; therefore the correlations were not expected to be strong. For the whole 
sample, the ER calculated on the six self-report items was correlated with the ER obtained from the 
  
30 vignette ratings at r = 0.26 (p < 0.001). The correlation between NRs based on self-reports and 
vignette ratings was somewhat lower (r = 0.15, p < 0.001). Our primary focus, however, was on the 
associations occurring at the level of sample means and not at the level of single individuals, as is 
typical in studies that compare countries. At the level of sample means (i.e., ignoring all within-
sample variance), the ecological associations may appear very different from the associations 
occurring at the level of individuals, where between-sample differences are mixed with other 
sources of variance. As is sometimes the case, at the level of sample means, the correlations 
between response style indices based on vignettes and self-reports were higher, with the Spearman 
correlations being rho = 0.71 (p < 0.001) and rho = 0.35 (p = 0.11) for ER and NR, respectively. 
Therefore, there was a strong tendency for sample-level extreme response style in the vignette 
ratings to track with sample-level extreme response style in self-reports. Here and hereafter 
Spearman rank-order correlation (rho) was used for analyzing sample-level associations because 
with only 22 values, Pearson correlations are especially sensitive to any violations of normality 
(e.g., due to outliers such as Hong Kong (China) for ER and Japan for mean self-reported 
Conscientiousness, see Table 2).  
 
The Associations of Response Styles with Self-Reported Conscientiousness Scores 
In nearly all samples means of the six self-reported Conscientiousness items deviated from the 
scale midpoint (3) in the direction of higher Conscientiousness (Mõttus et al., 2011, Table 2), which 
created a possibility for inflation of self-reports due to extreme responding (Baumgartner & 
Steenkamp, 2001). Assessment of the correlation between response styles and self-reported 
Conscientiousness provided a test of this possibility. At the level of the whole sample, self-reported 
Conscientiousness (mean of the six bipolar items) was positively correlated with the vignette-based 
ER (r = 0.20, p < 0.001). Excluding the within-samples variance by estimating the association at the 
level of sample means, the correlation was much higher (rho = 0.70, p < 0.001). That is, in the 
  
samples with the lowest mean self-reported Conscientiousness (Table 3), South-Korea and Japan, 
people also tended, on average, to use extreme response categories relatively less frequently to rate 
the 30 vignettes than people from most of the other samples. In contrast, respondents from Burkina 
Faso, Senegal and Benin had the highest mean self-reported Conscientiousness scores and they also 
tended to be among the frequent users of extreme response categories whilst rating the vignettes. 
The vignette-based NR was negatively but less strongly correlated with self-reported 
Conscientiousness (rho = -0.08, p < 0.001, for individual respondents and rho = -0.32, p = 0.14, at 
the level of sample means). We repeated the analyses for single Conscientiousness facets and 
obtained a largely similar pattern of results. At the level of individual respondents, correlations 
between ER (correlations for NR in parentheses) and Conscientiousness facets ranged from r = 0.09 
to 0.18 with a median of 0.13 (from r = -0.03 to -0.07 with a median of -0.05). At the level of 
sample means, correlations between ER (NR) and Conscientiousness facets ranged from rho = 0.42 
to 0.74 with a median of 0.57 (from rho = -0.03 to -0.52 with a median of -0.28). 
Table 3 about here 
 
Correcting Self-Reports for Response Styles 
Next, assuming that response styles may potentially have affected self-report scores, we tested 
to what degree removing the effects of extreme and neutral responding from self-reported 
Conscientiousness could change the rankings of people and samples on this trait. To this end, 
Conscientiousness scores were residualized (using multiple regression) for the vignette-based ER 
and NR, first at the level of individual respondents and then at the level of sample means. For 
individual respondents, the residualized scores correlated highly with the original 
Conscientiousness scores (r = 0.98, p < 0.001), suggesting essentially no effect of individual 
response styles on individual self-reports in the sample as a whole. However, because at the level of 
sample means the correlations between response style indices and self-reported Conscientiousness 
  
had been much higher (although non-significant for the NR due to the small number of samples), 
the effect of residualizing sample-level mean Conscientiousness scores for the mean response style 
indices was expected to be stronger. Before performing the regression to obtain residualized 
sample-level Conscientiousness scores, sample means of all variables were transformed to rankings 
to avoid the confounding effect of non-normality (e.g., Hong Kong’s outstandingly low mean ER 
value and Japan’s outstandingly low mean Conscientiousness score). The hypothesis was confirmed 
as the correlation between the original and residualized sample rankings of Conscientiousness was 
lower (rho = 0.68, p < 0.001) than the individual-level correlation of .98 given above. Repeating the 
analyses for single Conscientiousness facets yielded generally similar results. At the level of 
individual respondents, the correlations between original and residualized facet scores ranged from 
r = 0.98 to 1.00. At the level of sample means, correcting for response styles had the strongest 
effects for Dutifulness and Competence (rho = 0.59 and 0.67, p < 0.01, respectively) and weakest 
effects for Order and Deliberation (rho = 0.91 and 0.87, p < 0.001, respectively); the median 
correlation between the original and the residualized sample rankings was rho = 0.81. 
The rankings of samples based on both the original and residualized mean Conscientiousness 
scores are given in Table 3. Among the biggest changes, Hong Kong (China) moved 11, Germany 8, 
South-Korea 7, Mauritius and Sweden 5, Beijing (China) 4 and Japan 3 positions upwards, whereas 
Malaysia and Changchun (China) moved 7, Burkina Faso, Philippines and Poland 6, Russia 4 and 
Senegal and South Africa 3 positions downwards in terms of mean Conscientiousness scores. 
 
The Effect of Response Styles on the Predictive Validity of Conscientiousness Rankings 
As correcting for response style differences had a notable effect on sample rankings on 
Conscientiousness, we tested whether the correction also reflected in the correlations of these 
rankings with GDP and LE. The original sample-level mean Conscientiousness scores correlated 
with these variables at rho = -0.71 (p < 0.001) and rho = -0.65 (p < 0.01), respectively. The 
  
residualized mean Conscientiousness scores, however, had notably lower correlations with GDP 
and LE, rho = -0.33 (p = 0.13) and rho = -0.26 (p = 0.24), respectively. We obtained similar 
findings for single Conscientiousness facets: uncorrected sample means of the six facets correlated 
with GDP in the range of rho = -0.39 to -0.69 (median rho = -0.65) whereas the residualized sample 
means had much lower correlations (from rho = 0.00 to -0.47, median -0.28). For LE, the respective 
correlations ranged from rho = -0.31 to -0.68 (median rho = -0.57) and from rho = -0.15 to -0.54 
(median rho = -0.25).  
 
  
DISCUSSION 
Cross-cultural comparative research is based on the assumption that measurements made in 
different cultural contexts (e.g., countries, regions) are comparable. That is, when trait-levels are 
compared, the same observed levels should correspond to the same true trait-levels in all groups 
under comparison. The most serious threat to this assumption comes from systematic biases in the 
observed trait-levels. Therefore, identifying any possible systematic biases and developing means 
for overcoming them are essential for the development of cross-cultural comparative research. 
Using a novel approach for separating response style effects on self-reports from the true 
variance of traits, the present study demonstrated cross-cultural differences in the tendency to prefer 
extreme response categories of bipolar items over more moderate ones when rating the personality 
trait Conscientiousness. Although there was generally little variance in extreme response style 
among most European, American and Australian samples, respondents from other world regions 
often displayed different degrees of preference for the extreme responses. Both individual and 
cross-sample differences in the tendency to use extreme response categories as quantified on the 
basis of the vignette ratings were associated with extreme response style as observed in self-reports 
and—more important—with the self-reported Conscientiousness scores themselves. As is often (but 
certainly not always) the case with such ecological correlations, these associations were particularly 
strong at the aggregate level of the 22 samples (Spearman rho = 0.70). Controlling for cross-sample 
differences in extreme response style (as well as the preference for the neutral middle-point 
response categories) had notable effects on the rankings of the samples on Conscientiousness. The 
corrections also changed the predictive validities of these rankings for GDP and average life 
expectancy. Below, it will be discussed whether the changes in the predictive validities can be 
considered meaningful. 
The present study focused on the identification and possible consequences of cross-cultural 
differences in response styles and not on explaining the observed response style differences. For the 
  
sake of completeness, however, a brief comment on the latter is warranted. A look at Table 2 readily 
shows that lower mean levels of extreme responding are associated with higher economic and social 
development and East Asian cultures, whereas high mean levels of extreme responding mainly (but 
not exclusively) characterize economically less developed countries and African and Southeast 
Asian cultures. Besides a very general explanation that higher levels of societal development (e.g., 
higher mean educational level) may incline people to, on average, abstain from overly extreme 
judgements, one might hypothesize that cross-cultural differences in what is called dialectical 
thinking may contribute to the variations in response styles. Dialectical thinking is characterized by 
“an emphasis on change, a recognition of contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, 
and a search for the “Middle Way” between opposing propositions” (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001, p. 293). As a result, dialectical thinking may lead to less extreme and polarized 
subjective judgements because low and high trait levels can trait levels can easily co-exist and 
change for dialectical thinkers. It has been hypothesized that East Asian cultures are characterized 
by higher degrees of dialectical thinking than Western of African cultures (e.g., Schimmack, Oishi, 
& Diener, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010).There is indeed some empirical 
evidence for higher levels of dialectical thinking being associated with less polarized judgements 
(Minkov, 2009; Hamamura et al., 2008).  
However, the limited number of countries used in the present study and even more limited 
overlap with the existing datasets on dialectical thinking (for which especially little data are 
available for African cultures; e.g., Schimmack et al., 2002) prevented us from formally testing 
these associations. We hope that future studies will continue to investigate the possible role of 
dialectical thinking on cross-cultural variability in response styles empirically, as it appears in self-
ratings or ratings of other people (e.g., vignettes). Likewise, although differences in dialectical 
thinking seem currently one of the most plausible explanations for geographical differences in 
extreme or neutral response styles, future studies may consider other theoretically relevant 
  
constructs. However, for any explanations, it will be important to make sure that the scores on the 
explanatory variables themselves are not confounded by response styles (van Herk et al., 2004). 
 
Theoretical Implications of the Findings 
The results of this study suggest that the puzzling country rankings of Conscientiousness may, 
to some extent, result from cross-cultural differences in the tendencies to prefer extreme response 
categories of self-report measures over more moderate response categories. After adjusting for the 
response style differences, samples from Changchun (China), Malaysia, Burkina Faso, Philippines 
and Poland that had high prevalences of extreme responding, slipped downwards in the rankings of 
mean Conscientiousness scores. In contrast, Hong Kong (China), Germany, South-Korea, 
Mauritius, Sweden and Japan where respondents somewhat less often chose extreme response 
categories to rate the vignettes, moved upwards in mean Conscientiousness. After adjusting for the 
response style differences, the counterintuitive, as some authors think (Heine et al., 2008), 
correlations with GDP and average life-expectancy were also notably attenuated and were no longer 
statistically significant. Thus, although correcting for the response style differences certainly did not 
reverse the Conscientiousness-rankings of samples and their correlations with external criteria, it 
had a clear effect.   
Of course, although it is sometimes thought that negative correlations between mean 
Conscientiousness and national economic output or average life-expectancy demonstrate the 
invalidity of mean Conscientiousness scores (Heine et al., 2008), alternative interpretations are also 
possible. It may be that the direction of the observed associations is in fact meaningfully 
interpretable (Mõttus et al., 2010, 2011; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). However, what may be even 
more worrisome about the observed uncorrected associations is their strength. For example, in this 
study, mean Conscientiousness scores explained half of the variance in GDP [a very similar 
correlation was reported by Mõttus et al., (2010) on a larger number of countries and using another 
  
self-report measure of Conscientiousness]. Taking into account possible unreliability of the 
Conscientiousness measure, this is a very strong association indeed. Although ecological 
correlations are often high, this is by no means inevitable or trivial (for a discussion see Asendorpf's 
comment in Allik et al., 2007). Should this be causally interpreted as national differences in the lack 
of Conscientiousness accounting for more than half of differences in economic output? This may be 
highly unrealistic considering that there is probably a myriad of reasons why nations differ in their 
economic output in a given year. The converse is also true: expecting national differences in 
economic output in a given year to cause the majority of the cross-country variance in personality 
scores is simply not realistic. Sometimes, thus, it is precisely the strength (not the weakness or 
absence) of the observed associations that is theoretically most alarming (Lykken, 1968). If this line 
of reasoning is true, this leaves us with the Conscientiousness-GDP associations being confounded 
on top of, or even instead of, any substantive associations. Therefore, the more modest, albeit non-
significant due to a small number of samples, validity correlations after correcting self-reported 
Conscientiousness for response styles are perhaps in a more meaningful range than the uncorrected 
associations. 
These results also suggest that response styles will contribute to difficulties in achieving full 
measurement invariance across a wide range of cultures when assessing Conscientiousness (and 
possibly other traits) by means of self-reports. Lack of measurement invariance means that trait 
scores obtained from different samples do not reflect exactly the same trait to the same degree, due 
to indicators defining the trait with different loadings, intercepts and/or residual variances. It has 
been shown that differences in extreme responding affect both factor loadings and intercepts of 
observed indicator scores on latent personality traits (Cheung & Rensvold, 2000). There being 
contributions from cross-cultural differences in response styles to measurement non-invariance 
would be consistent with the existing reports describing difficulties in establishing measurement 
equivalence of personality traits across cultures (e.g., Church, Alvarez, Mai, French, Katigbak, & 
  
Ortiz, 2011; Johnson, Spinath, Krueger, Angleitner, & Riemann, 2008; Rossier, Dahourou, & 
McCrae, 2005). Of course, it must be noted that response style differences may be only one source 
of cross-cultural measurement non-invariance of personality traits. However, if the effects of 
response style differences on mean self-reported Conscientiousness and other personality trait 
scores prove to be replicable and causal in future studies, their measurement invariance implications 
will need to be heeded in cross-cultural personality research. 
 
Alternative Interpretations 
Correcting the rankings of self-reported Conscientiousness for response style differences was 
based on the hypothesis that differences in response style, as measured on the basis of the vignette 
ratings, could potentially contribute to the observed differences in self-reported Conscientiousness. 
That is, we hypothesized that these were the response styles that may have distorted the rankings of 
self-reports rather than the other way around. However, we are fully aware that there are alternative 
ways to interpret the association between response styles and self-reported Conscientiousness 
(Austin, Deary, & Egan, 2006). For example, it is possible that the sample rankings of self-reported 
Conscientiousness were in fact accurate and it was living in highly conscientious cultural settings 
(e.g., in Burkina Faso) that made respondents use extreme response categories rather than moderate 
response categories whilst rating the vignettes. Or, response styles and self-reported 
Conscientiousness may have co-varied due to unknown common determinants. Thus, although it is 
easy to see how response styles can affect self-reported trait scores when most people, for whatever 
reason, prefer one side of Likert-type or bipolar rating scales (as was described above), there is no 
strict empirical evidence as yet for preferring this causal explanation over the alternative ones.  
For an ultimate test of which explanation is most plausible, we would need to investigate the 
associations between response style indices and Conscientiousness as measured independently of 
self-reports (cf. McCrae & Costa, 1983). If response style indices were associated with self-reported 
  
Conscientiousness scores but not with the alternative and independent operationalizations of the 
trait, it would indicate that response styles are likely to be causal contributors, beyond actual trait 
levels, to self-reported trait-scores. In contrast, if response styles were similarly associated with 
alternative operationalizations of Conscientiousness, it would probably mean that 
Conscientiousness itself determines response styles or that both result from some overlapping 
unknown causes. However, there are currently no good ways to measure cross-cultural differences 
in Conscientiousness independently of self-reports (or related methods). Note that even peer-reports 
are not helpful here because the cross-cultural differences in response styles are likely to generalize 
to all types of ratings made using ordinal rating-scales, so similar culture differences are likely also 
to appear in peer-reports.  
Therefore, as long as there is no empirical way of testing whether extreme responding indeed 
confounds the observed mean self-report scores or is simply a yet another manifestation of veridical 
cross-sample differences in Conscientiousness, we have to rely on common sense to interpret the 
association between extreme response style in vignette ratings and self-reported Conscientiousness. 
It is currently difficult to give a theoretical explanation for why higher mean Conscientiousness (the 
same high mean Conscientiousness that is very strongly predictive of low national wealth and low 
mean life-expectancy) should causally make people prefer extreme responses over moderate ones. 
If anything, the opposite could be expected because one of the Conscientiousness facets is 
Deliberation, which, in the present study, was defined as being cautious, reflective and careful: it is 
perhaps commonsensical to expect cautious people to refrain from extreme statements such as 
giving extreme trait-ratings when somewhat limited information about the targets is available. 
Likewise, we cannot think of any meaningful common determinants of both response styles and 
mean Conscientiousness scores. Therefore, it currently seems most reasonable to believe that an 
explanation which has all necessary elements in place (as has been explained above, we can see the 
“mechanics” of how extreme response style can affect self-reported Conscientiousness scores under 
  
the present circumstances) could be preferred to explanations that are possible but do not have any 
theoretical account as yet to support them.  
 
Practical Implications 
In addition to the substantive contribution, this study featured vignettes as potentially useful 
practical tools for identifying and mitigating extreme response style. Could this method be useful in 
future cross-cultural psychological research? Based on the fact that it is already being used in areas 
such as health (Grol-Prokopczyk, Freese, & Hauser, 2011) or economics (Kristensen & Johansson, 
2008) surveys—with backing from the statistical community (van Soest, Delaney, Harmon, 
Kapteyn, & Smith, 2011)—to identify and overcome the RGE-type measurement issues, there is no 
fundamental reason, at least, why it couldn't be practically used in psychological research. Like all 
methods, it has both strengths and limitations, which make it more suitable for some research 
purposes than others. Perhaps the most important strength of the approach is that it can be used for 
more than one purpose. Although in many cases alternative methods for quantifying response styles 
or dealing with their consequences are available—such as calculating extreme responding on the 
basis of a set of uncorrelated items (Greenleaf, 1992; Hamamura et al., 2008) or ipsatizing scores 
(Fischer, 2004)—the advantage of the anchoring vignette approach (King & Wand, 2007) is that it 
provides a more generic, yet simple and intuitive method for simultaneously detecting various types 
of biases, such as trait-specific RGE (Mõttus et al., 2011) or response styles that cut across 
constructs. The most important issue with the method is cost—it requires additional survey items 
(vignettes) to be administered. 
The decisions about whether the strengths outweigh the cost or exactly how much needs to be 
invested in the vignette approach probably depend on what researchers are most worried about. If 
response styles are the only possible source of threat for the comparability of self-reports, then 
researchers may use other methods for detecting bias (Greenleaf, 1992; Hamamura et al., 2008). 
  
Alternatively, they may administer a limited number of vignettes: since response styles are, by 
definition, independent of specific item content, response styles quantified on the basis of one trait 
are likely to generalize to other trait. Additionally, there is probably no need to administer 30 
vignettes to quantify response styles for one trait [Mõttus and colleagues (2011) administered 30 
vignettes because they wanted to address six specific facets of Conscientiousness having 5 vignettes 
for each facet]. Perhaps five or even less vignettes for one or more questionnaire items can provide 
enough information to quantify response styles.  
However, if researchers cannot rule out the existence of an RGE type of bias, the vignette-
method could be used to its full potential. Then vignettes should be administered for all of the traits 
that may potentially suffer from the biases. For example, researchers can choose one to three items 
from each domain (e.g., the Big Five domains) and administer three or more vignettes for each. Of 
note is that dealing with neither response styles nor RGE (King & Wand, 2007) strictly assumes that 
all respondents have to be administered the vignettes: the biases can be identified using only 
subsamples of each sample and then generalized to populations. Of course, in some cases, even this 
may be too costly whereas in some cases the price of not fully addressing the problems may 
outweigh the cost of additional survey items. One of such cases where the price of not properly 
dealing with possible biases may be especially high is when researchers are faced with puzzling 
findings such as the country-rankings of Conscientiousness. 
 
Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
The primary strengths of this study were the novel method for disentangling response bias 
from true variance and the ability to see if the response style differences across people and samples 
measured using the ratings of invariant targets were associated with self-reports of the same people 
and samples. Also a noteworthy strength is the range of cultures incorporated; for instance, to date 
little was known about extreme response style in African samples.  
  
Among the limitations is the not particularly large number of samples, which may influence 
the reliability of the sample-level estimates. Moreover, the results of all cross-cultural studies highly 
depend on the comparability of the translations of testing material and, despite the efforts that were 
made to grant equivalency of the measures, this study was no exception. However, the cross-sample 
differences in response style were probably not caused by differences in translations because in 
several samples identical translations were used but response styles differed. In particular, the Hong 
Kong and Beijing Chinese samples were tested with the same Chinese translation, Switzerland and 
several African samples (e.g. Senegal and Burkina Faso) tested with the same French translation, 
and Australia, USA and South Africa were tested with the same English translation; yet response 
styles were different. Other confounding sources of cross-cultural variance, however, remain 
possible. Finally, different types of response scales (e.g., Likert-type), or scales with different 
numbers of response categories (e.g., 3, 7, 9) may have resulted in different results (Hui & Triandis, 
1989). 
 
Conclusion 
The RGE has been the primary suspect for distorting cross-cultural comparisons of mean 
Conscientiousness scores (Heine et al., 2008). However, the first use of the anchoring vignettes 
method (King & Wand, 2007) in cross-cultural personality research provided only little evidence for 
RGE affecting country-rankings of Conscientiousness (Mõttus et al., 2011). Extending the 
applicability of the method to a completely different source of bias, this study showed that response 
style, especially extreme responding, is a far stronger candidate for distorting country-rankings of 
Conscientiousness than the RGE. Beyond the particular problem of geographical variations in 
Conscientiousness, the results of this study show that quantifying response styles on the basis of 
vignette ratings is likely to be helpful in identifying differences in response styles and, equally 
importantly, in correcting for their effects. What is more, the method allows researchers to identify 
  
different sources of measurement bias at the same time. Thus, the study made a unique substantive 
contribution to the literature in potentially moving towards an explanation of the paradox of mean 
Conscientiousness scores but it also made a unique methodological contribution in extending the 
applicability of the anchoring vignettes approach to dealing with response style problems in cross-
cultural measurement and beyond this.   
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Table 1.  
Correlations between the response category choice frequencies from two independent subsets of 
vignettes. 
 B 
A 
Extreme left 
(neg) 
Moderate left 
(neg) 
Neutral 
Moderate right 
(pos) 
Extreme right 
(pos) 
Extreme left 
(pos) 
.36 (.44; .60) -.28 (-.31; -.48) -.30 (-.25; -.38) -.47 (-.29; -.51) .59 (.41; .63) 
Moderate left 
(pos) 
-.39 (-.31; -.47) .29 (.30; .42) .22 (.04; .20) .43 (.26; .45) -.46 (-.27; -.49) 
Neutral -.24 (-.24; -.38) .02* (.05; .20) .43 (.36; .48) .18 (.12; .22) -.31 (-.26; -.40) 
Moderate right 
(neg) 
-.41 (-.28; -.51) .38 (.26; .46) .11 (.11; .22) .39 (.35; .46) -.40 (-.40; -.52) 
Extreme right 
(neg) 
.55 (.40; .63) -.35 (-.27; -.49) -.35 (-.26; -.40) -.44 (-.40; -.51) .47 (.48; .63) 
  
NOTE: N = 2,961. The bipolar response category choice frequencies were calculated on items as 
they appeared to respondents (five categories ranging from extreme left to extreme right). A = 
Response category choice frequencies based on the first subset of vignettes (rated for Competence, 
Dutifulness, and Self-Discipline; higher levels of the traits were endorsed by choosing the left-side 
categories); B = Response category choice frequencies based on the second subset of vignettes 
(rated for Order, Achievement-Striving, and Deliberation; higher levels of the traits were endorsed 
by choosing the right-side categories); pos = positive, higher levels of Conscientiousness; neg = 
negative, lower levels of Conscientiousness. In brackets are 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the 
distributions of 1,000 correlations calculated between respective response category frequencies 
  
from random subsets of vignettes (15 vignettes in each).  
*This correlation was not statistically significant, whereas all other correlations were significant at p 
< 0.001 (with no adjustment for multiple testing).  
  
Table 2.  
Mean response style indices based on vignette ratings for the 22 samples. 
 ER (M) ER(SD) 
ER  
(rankings) 
NR(M) NR(SD) 
NR  
(rankings) 
Hong Kong (China) 0.49 0.21 1 0.14 0.09 19 
South-Korea 0.56 0.17 2 0.14 0.08 14 
Germany 0.58 0.14 3 0.14 0.07 16 
Japan 0.59 0.20 4 0.13 0.09 11 
Mauritius 0.60 0.20 5 0.15 0.11 21 
Sweden 0.63 0.17 6 0.15 0.07 22 
Australia 0.64 0.16 7 0.09 0.07 2 
Beijing (China) 0.64 0.17 8 0.11 0.07 5 
Lithuania 0.64 0.16 9 0.13 0.08 12 
Switzerland 0.64 0.14 10 0.14 0.08 15 
Estonia 0.65 0.15 11 0.12 0.07 9 
Mali 0.65 0.17 12 0.09 0.09 1 
Russia 0.65 0.15 13 0.14 0.08 20 
USA 0.67 0.15 14 0.14 0.10 17 
Benin 0.68 0.27 15 0.12 0.08 8 
South Africa 0.68 0.21 16 0.14 0.09 18 
Malaysia 0.69 0.17 17 0.11 0.08 3 
Senegal 0.69 0.22 18 0.11 0.08 4 
Philippines 0.70 0.18 19 0.12 0.07 7 
Poland 0.70 0.17 20 0.12 0.09 6 
Burkina Faso 0.71 0.20 21 0.12 0.08 10 
  
Changchun (China) 0.72 0.18 22 0.14 0.09 13 
Grand M 0.64   0.12   
Grand SD 0.18   0.08   
 
NOTE: ER = Average index of extreme responding of the samples; NR = Average index of neutral 
responding of the samples; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.  
  
Table 3.  
Mean self-reported Conscientiousness for the 22 samples before and after correcting for response 
styles. 
 C (M) C (SD) C (rankings) Cres Cres (rankings) 
Japan 3.13 0.77 1 -1.21 4 
South-Korea 3.45 0.55 2 -0.65 9 
Lithuania 3.54 0.53 3 -1.30 2 
Australia 3.62 0.64 4 -1.21 3 
Russia 3.67 0.66 5 -1.56 1 
Switzerland 3.69 0.52 6 -0.90 7 
Estonia 3.73 0.58 7 -0.92 6 
Mauritius 3.74 0.62 8 0.36 13 
Hong Kong (China) 3.76 0.67 9 1.16 20 
Germany 3.77 0.59 10 1.02 18 
Sweden 3.85 0.50 11 0.90 16 
Malaysia 3.89 0.56 12 -0.99 5 
USA 3.93 0.54 13 0.06 12 
Poland 3.94 0.65 14 -0.66 8 
Beijing (China) 3.96 0.58 15 1.05 19 
Philippines 3.97 0.56 16 -0.35 10 
South Africa 4.01 0.58 17 0.66 14 
Changchun (China) 4.06 0.62 18 -0.12 11 
Mali 4.23 0.43 19 1.47 21 
Senegal 4.25 0.53 20 0.93 17 
Burkina Faso 4.27 0.55 21 0.66 15 
  
Benin 4.37 0.53 22 1.69 22 
Grand M 3.83     
Grand SD 0.65     
 
NOTE: C = Conscientiousness; M = mean; SD = standard deviation; Cres = standardized regression 
residuals after regressing sample mean Conscientiousness scores (column 2) on the mean extreme 
and neutral responding scores (given in Table 2).  
  
FIGURE CAPTIONS 
Figure 1. Mean response category choice frequencies in three samples. Category numbers 1 to 5 
designate the five response categories of the bipolar scale from extreme left to extreme right as they 
appeared to respondents. 
 
 
